

NOV 72

PERIODIC REVIEW: SB OPERATIONS PROGRAM

[]

1 April 1972 - 30 September 1972

I. SOVIET AND BLOC PRESENCE:

There are about 171 Soviets stationed in the Bonn/Cologne area. Of these, 90 are assigned to the Embassy in Bonn, 64 are with the Trade Mission in Cologne and the remaining 17 are news correspondents. Fifty-three of them are known or suspected intelligence officers.

There are 190 Bloc officials assigned in the Bonn/Cologne area. Included are 51 Yugoslavs, 60 Romanians, 41 Hungarians, 33 Poles and 5 Czechs.

II. PREVIOUS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The panel reviewing [] SB Program during the period from 1 October through 31 March 1972 noted in particular that [] had made no recruitment approaches to Primary Soviet Targets during this or preceding operational periods. It was concluded that this was due in part to the fact that, with the exception of AERAVEN (Petr OSIPOV), [] had not succeeded in uncovering any Primary Target displaying sufficient vulnerabilities to justify such an approach. On this basis, the panel recommended a more rapid turn-over of targets (Three or four months was considered sufficient time to determine whether a particular target is worth pursuing further.) and also suggested that, with its 25 case officers, [] realistically could, and should, increase the number of its Primary Soviet Targets from four to six.

Discussion of [] then current Primary Target operations focused on the AEWILLET (Lev POMERANTSEV), AEGREBE (Vyacheslav GURENKOV) and AERAVEN cases. Because AEWILLET was scheduled to depart Germany on sick leave, from which he quite probably would not return, the panel recommended that he be dropped from the targetting list. The panel approved [] efforts and progress on the AEGREBE and AERAVEN cases and encouraged accelerated, planned movement toward recruitment. With the exception of those relating to AEWILLET, the panel concurred in all the operational tasks set for the following period.

A number of Bonn/Cologne based Soviets, including particularly AEWREN (Vyacheslav Petrovich STEPANOV) and Yuriy Ivanovich ABRASHKIN, were discussed as a possible replacement for AEWILLET and as potential additions to [] Primary Target list; [] was subsequently asked to consider these. The panel also suggested that [] consider selecting a primary target from among the bloc officials stationed in its area.

III. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD:

A. General Comments: Excluding those aimed at AEWILLET,

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[] set itself 32 specific operational goals for this review period. Seventy-five percent of these were accomplished or partly accomplished, a statistic which compares favorably with the analogous figure of 66 percent for the previous period. [] also noted the accomplishment of a number of unscheduled tasks, relating primarily to its new primary target and several targets of opportunity.

B. New Primary Targets: In June [] selected AERDEFENSE (Dmitriy GUDKOV, 52 year old Soviet Union House correspondent and suspected GRU officer) as a Primary Target to replace AEWILLET, who had returned PCS to the Soviet Union in mid-May. No additional, new Primary Targets have been designated. However, [] continued to focus its interest on TORADIOS Target ALEBARBLER (Lev Aleksandrovich BEZYMENSKIY, KGB agent and "New Times" representative) and reactivated its operation against former primary target AETOWHEE (Vadim Sergeyevich IVANOV, 43 year old TASS correspondent, probably not an intelligence officer). On the basis of additional vulnerability information accumulated during the period, [] submitted a plan for a recruitment approach to the latter. Additionally, [] has begun systematically to develop information on two "secondary targets" -- AEBUNTING (Vladimir ULANOV, a 32 year old suspect KGB officer assigned to the Trade Mission) and AEFORT (Viktor SHEPELEV, a 39 year old known GRU officer also at the Trade Mission).

C. Activity against Primary Targets:

1. AERAVEN (Petr Sergeyevich OSIPOV) is a 34 year old KGB officer assigned as a cultural attache to the Embassy in Bonn since December 1969. As its main accomplishment during this period [] was able to confirm AERAVEN's homosexual inclinations; these had been first reported in September 1971 by CATOMIC-19, an Iranian diplomat and SAVAK agent who has been Bonn's principle source of access to this target. In August, however, apparently acting on a tip from the BfV, CATOMIC-19 was recalled to Teheran, where he was grilled by SAVAK concerning his contacts with Soviets in Bonn, including AERAVEN. He is still in Iran and it increasingly appears that he will not be permitted to return to Germany. Meanwhile, although [] has identified several additional contacts of AERAVEN and although CATOMIC-19's German-born wife, CATOMIC-20, has had occasional contact with this target, the operation has been pretty much at a standstill. The tasks set by Bonn for the upcoming period, which are premised on the probability that CATOMIC-19 has been permanently removed from the scene, represent an attempt to get it moving again by establishing and revitalizing additional staff and agent contacts with AERAVEN.
2. AEGREBE (Vyacheslav GURENKOV) is a 35 year old representative of the Soviet foreign trade organization EKSPORTLES who works out of the Trade Mission in Cologne. Carried as a suspect RIS officer throughout this past period, AEGREBE has recently been the

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subject of an SE/CI file review which concluded that no current basis exists for classifying him as such. As in the past, most of []'s reporting on this target came from CATOMIC-5, a German driver who chauffeurs AEGREBE on business trips outside Cologne. None of his reporting during this period has been of particular significance. [] has continued its effort to identify AEGREBE's many business contacts and one of these, CATOMIC-52, [] who was recruited during the period, has begun to supply supplementary access reporting on him. A development of probably greater operational interest, however, was the establishment of contact between CATOMIC-34 and AEGREBE. The two appear to have hit it off at once and, because CATOMIC-34 is a diplomatic supplier while AEGREBE has recently been placed in charge of the Trade Mission commissary, a premise exists for continuing and enhancing this relationship. Recalling that the most substantial indication of vulnerability we have on AEGREBE is the report from CATOMIC-5 that he once pocketed a sizeable kickback from a business deal, [] is now considering ways of using CATOMIC-34 to involve him in similar, compromising transactions.

3. AESKIMMER (Mikhail PODVIGIN) is a 32 year old identified KGB officer who works as the junior man in the TASS office in Bonn. He has been a Primary Target since February 1972, when he was selected as a replacement for AETOWHEE. During this review period, [] made excellent progress against this target through contract agent [] three CATOMIC journalist assets, and CACLOCK-15a, a transplant from Berlin. [] intends to decide soon whether to proceed against or drop this target. The extensive assessment information so far gathered from its various sources has not yet pointed to any actual or potential susceptibilities. AESKIMMER comes across as an intelligent, self-controlled, strongly patriotic young Soviet, without any evident vices.
4. AEDEFENSE (Dmitriy GUDKOV) is a 52 year old journalist assigned in Cologne who is suspected, on still tenuous evidence, of being a GRU officer. He was chosen in July 1972 to replace AEWILLET as a primary target, a choice prompted by already existing access and one which considered several factors limiting his target potential, especially his age. [] in nominating AEDEFENSE, classified him as a "temporary primary target" and proposed to review the operation in October 1972, at which time the case would be dropped if no meaningful access had been established. Since then, in late July, three [] assets -- CATOMICS 14, 22 and 36 travelled to Moscow to negotiate a contract for production of a television series on the Soviet Union and were entertained there by AEDEFENSE, who had been instrumental in arranging the trip. One product of this was an excellent assessment debriefing of CATOMIC-14 who now feels that he has a "friendly and cordial" relationship, verging on a "certain intimacy" with this target. [] hopes to be able to further move the CATOMIC-14/AEDEFENSE

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recruited CATOMIC-52 cocktail party planned cable 30 Nov

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relationship from the business to the personal sphere during the upcoming period. Other plans include the introduction of an attractive young female (CATOMIC-14 believes AEDDEFENSE might prove susceptible to this line of attack) and possibly an attempt by CATOMIC-56 to induce AEDDEFENSE to accept bribes and kickbacks within the context of their business relationship. Finally, from teletap information, [] has identified and is investigating a number of AEDDEFENSE'S other contacts.

D. Activity against Secondary Targets:

1. AETOWHEE (Vadim IVANOV) is a 41 year old TASS correspondent assigned in Bonn since the fall of 1970. He was carried as a Primary Target until late 1971 when, following a conclusion that he probably is not an intelligence officer and therefore has only limited potential intelligence access, he was dropped. The relatively close personal relationship which AETOWHEE had developed with CATOMIC-6 (female journalist) was permitted to continue, however, and resulted in the acquisition of additional susceptibility information which in April prompted [] to resurrect the case and propose a recruitment attempt. (AETOWHEE was then trying, through CATOMIC-6, to have samizdat poetry written by his mistress in the Soviet Union published in the Russian emigree press and had also in various ways shown signs of venality.) Headquarters approved []'s plan, which called for the introduction of [] officer [] under appropriate pretext for final assessment and, if appropriate, to make a recruitment proposal. It was estimated that this would require approximately six meetings between [] and AETOWHEE and [] hoped that the introduction could take place in August so as to complete the process prior to AETOWHEE's departure on home leave in mid-September. For a variety of unforeseen reasons these plans did not work out and the introduction had to be deferred until after the target's return to Bonn in late October. Meanwhile [] successfully installed a short-term audio device in AETOWHEE's apartment, which may help assess his reaction to [] (In mid-November, following submission of its Periodic Review [] reported that CATOMIC-6 has obtained AETOWHEE's agreement to meet with [] in order to discuss AETOWHEE's possible paid collaboration on a tourist guide which [] is ostensibly writing. The introduction is set to take place sometime during the week of 27 November.)
2. AEBUNTING (Vladimir ULANOV) is a 32 year old Trade Mission representative who replaced a suspected intelligence officer in Cologne in early 1971. BOU considers him a potential primary target and, for this period, had set itself the task of developing access to and assessing at least two of his personal contacts. Working from CAPISSION teletap production, [] succeeded in identifying 15 persons and firms with whom AEBUNTING would probably have contact at

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the Hannover Fair in April. Contact was made at the fair with three of those who are now being assessed as possible access sources.

5. AEFORT (Viktor SHEPHELEV) is a 39 year old known GRU officer assigned to the Trade Mission as the representative of several Soviet foreign trade organizations. [] also hoped to be able to contact and begin assessment of at least two of AEFORT's contacts during this past period. CATOMIC-5, who encounters AEFORT often on his visits to the Trade Mission, was questioned about him but was able to supply very little information. [] reporting indicates that nothing further has been accomplished against this target.

E. Targets of Opportunity:

1. AECRANE (Anatoliy ABRANOV) is a 35 year old suspect KGB officer assigned to the Trade Mission in Cologne, where he represents the same Soviet foreign trade organization (EKSPORTLES) as primary target AEGREBE. Coverage of him is a by-product of the AEGREBE operation, with reporting coming from CATOMIC-5 and CATOMIC-52. As none of this has been forwarded to Headquarters during the past period, we are probably safe in assuming that no information of significance has been developed.
2. AERAM (Viktor PSHONKIN) is a 35 year old Izvestiya correspondent and suspected KGB officer in Bonn. Until recently [] primary target, AERAM transferred to Bonn in October and is now considered a potential primary target replacement for his close friend AESKIMMER, when and if the decision is made to drop the latter. [] CATOMIC-6 and CATOMIC-33 have occasional contact with AERAM as a byproduct of their efforts to develop access to AESKIMMER and he should be accessible to other assets through his participation in press conferences, meetings of the Foreign Press Association and similar functions.
3. Vadim KOVACHENKO is a 33 year old Third Secretary in the Embassy's Scientific and Technical Section. [] officers [] and, until his PCS return to Headquarters, [] have met KOVACHENKO and describe him as a cultured, refined young Soviet who, however has exhibited no unorthodox behavior or ideas which would suggest susceptibility to recruitment. Nonetheless, as a bright young man in an interesting field, [] places him high on its list of potential targets.
4. Yevgeniy KOROLEV is a 40 year old probable KGB officer assigned in Bonn since August 1971 as correspondent of the Soviet journal "Socialist Industry". KOROLEV has renewed his contact with [] established during his first tour in Bonn (1964-1969) and other media assets have come into contact with him during his current tour. On the basis of established access, he is also considered a primary target candidate.

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5. ABCAPTURE (Yevgeniy DYCHENKO) is a 43 year old known KGB officer now on his first assignment in Bonn, where he is a First Secretary in the Embassy Political Section, after a long tour in East Berlin. He probably occupies a senior position in the Residency and, as some seven officers and assets have reported on their contacts with ABCAPTURE without uncovering any clear susceptibilities or lines of operational approach, he does not at the moment appear to be Primary Target material.
6. Yuriy ABRASHKIN, a probable KGB officer, is also assigned to the Embassy's Political Section, where he specializes in coverage of the SPD. One of Bonn's more visible Soviets, ABRASHKIN attends functions of the Young Diplomats' Club, regularly visits the American Embassy Club where he plays volleyball with a group of correspondents, and has been in occasional contact with a number of [] officers and agents. A considerable amount of background and personality information has been collected since ABRASHKIN arrived in Bonn in 1969, but no signs of vulnerability have surfaced.
- F. Bloc Targets: [] has not as yet proposed a primary target from the Bloc, but in its periodic review lists Eugeniusz GUZ, a 43 year old Polish journalist who is in occasional contact with and apparently enamoured by female journalist asset CATOMIC-6, as one of its targets of opportunity. Separate correspondence indicates that the Duesseldorf task force is zeroing in on Lojze KERSNIK, a suspected intelligence cooptee, who was proposed as a possible Yugoslav primary target by Headquarters. An attempt is being made to introduce [] officer [] and several assets to KERSNIK for further assessment. [] has also named several other Yugoslavs in the Bonn area against whom it is working.

IV. ACCESS ASSETS:

[] now has 43 active CATOMIC assets working in the SB area. Fourteen of these are in regular close personal or professional contact with Soviet targets and 8 others had contact of a lesser degree with these targets during this period. Twelve CATOMIC assets were used exclusively on tracking missions and the remaining nine performed essentially passive roles, i.e., OP and LP keepers. An additional 9 assets encrypted under other projects contributed at least a part of their time to the Soviet target.

V. OTHER OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY:

- A. Unilateral Audio Operations: The short-term mike and wire installation made in AETOWHEE's apartment while this recruitment target was on home leave in October (subsequent to submission of this Periodic Review) is []'s only active residential audio operation. A proposal to plant an audio device in the TASS office employing primary target AESKIMMER was submitted in May. Headquarters, however, has discouraged further effort in this direction on the grounds that the target site does not appear promising for audio coverage (The

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target's working area in this office is not close to the proposed location of the device) and the high ambient noise environment of the office is likely to restrict greatly the quality of any product from such an installation.

- B. Telephone Monitoring Capabilities: The BfV provides raw tapes covering the two main Soviet Embassy switchboard lines and three lines installed in the residential Soviet high rise apartment building in Bonn. Similar coverage of a third embassy line -- recently installed for the exclusive use of Soviet colony members -- has been requested and will probably commence during the current period. From the BND, [] receives tapes of conversations on the two main lines into the Trade Mission and on three lines into the residential high rise in Cologne. Coverage of an additional three Trade Mission lines, which bypass the switchboard and lead to the offices of Primary Target AEGREBE and secondary targets AEFORT and AEBUNTING, has been requested. The BND also supplies tapes from the line leading into the office of Sowjetunion Heute in Cologne.
- C. Physical Surveillance: [] physical surveillance operations are carried out exclusively by [] staff personnel on a rotational basis. All [] case officers and many female personnel are surveillance trained. Available surveillance vehicles include four sedans and one van suitable for surreptitious photography or as a mobile LP. During this period the 30-watt communications equipment installed in the sedans was replaced by 50-watt gear.
- D. Liaison: Liaison is the responsibility [] and not []

VI. AGENDA ITEMS (Comments, Recommendations and Tasks):

- A. [] has made noteworthy progress in its efforts to establish and exploit access to its primary targets but for a variety of reasons, including those noted by the previous panel, is not much closer to recruiting a Soviet than at the start of the period. We continue to think that [] can and should carry more than the four primary targets and that, in most cases, three or four months should be sufficient time to determine whether to continue carrying a target on the primary list. In this connection:
1. We note particularly the thorough and useful assessment effort against AESKIMMER during the past year. This however, has turned up nothing to suggest that he may be recruitable and has resulted in considerable evidence that he is not. We suggest that [] be encouraged to drop AESKIMMER as a Primary Target sooner rather than later, selecting a replacement from among its secondary targets, targets of opportunity, or other Soviet contacts. [] reported that during this past period its officers once agents were in social, commercial or casual contact with a total of 67 PCS Soviets in West Germany.)

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2. The recent SB/CI conclusion that earlier indications of AEGREBE's possible intelligence affiliation were incorrect, coupled with the fact that []'s coverage of this target since last January has turned up no additional intelligence indicators, substantially reduces our interest in him. However, there are signs of possible vulnerability and CATOMIC-34's recently-established contact with AEGREBE gives some promise of exploiting these. While encouraging further pursuit of this target, we suggest that this can be done equally efficiently at the "secondary-target" level and that AEGREBE, too, should move over to make room for a new primary target.
 3. We are encouraged by signs that CATOMIC-14's long-standing business relationship with AEDEFENSE is growing increasingly personal and commend the thorough assessment report from CATOMIC-14 which [] recently submitted as one product of this relationship. Similar reports, promised by [] from two other assets in contact with this target should help considerably to fill out our picture of him. Although AEDEFENSE was initially selected as a "temporary" primary target, we agree with []'s apparent judgement that meaningful access to him has now been established and, on this basis, concur that work against him should continue during the current period.
 4. After mounting a successful operation to confirm AERAVEN's homosexual tendencies, [] suffered a serious set-back when its principle access source, CATOMIC-19, was suddenly and unexpectedly recalled to his homeland. We strongly underwrite []'s intention of establishing alternate, particularly staff-officer, contact with this target and, recognizing that CAWHISPER's growing interest in AERAVEN complicates the operational scene, encourage persistent and aggressive movement in this direction.
- B. Several of [] secondary targets and targets of opportunity appear to be promising candidates for elevation to primary target status, as replacement for current targets and as additions to this list. The more interesting of these include AERAM (PSHONKIN), whom [] is already considering as a replacement for AESKIMMER (PODVIGIN), AECRANE, AEBUNTING (ULANOV), AEFORT (SHEPELEV), Vadim KOVACHENKO and Yevgeniy KOROLEV. We are prepared to discuss these.
- C. Although there has been little substantive reporting during this period on Bloc targets, we are pleased by []'s initial plans and efforts against the Yugoslav and other Bloc targets. We will want to encourage these efforts.
- D. SB concurs with [] operational tasks for the current period.

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